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INVITED REVIEW
Theories of emotion causation: A review
Agnes Moors
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
I present an overview of emotion theories, organised around the question of
emotion causation. I argue that theories of emotion causation should ideally
address the problems of elicitation, intensity, and differentiation. Each of these
problems can be divided into a subquestion that asks about the relation between
stimuli and emotions (i.e., the functional level of process description, cf. Marr,
1982) and a subquestion that asks about the mechanism and representations that
intervene (i.e., the algorithmic level of process description). The overview reveals
that theories of emotion causation sometimes differ with regard to the kind of
process that they hold responsible for emotion causation. More precisely, they hold
different assumptions regarding the conditions under which the process is supposed
to operate (optimal versus suboptimal), the format of the representations involved
(propositional versus perceptual), and the object or input of the central process
(stimulus versus responses/experience). Further, the overview reveals that theories
of emotion causation sometimes differ with regard to the level of process
description that they focus on. Finally, the overview brings to light several
similarities among the theories discussed.
Keywords: Emotion theory; Causation; Elicitation; Appraisal; Constructivist.
In this paper I review a selection of emotion theories. I propose a framework
in which various theories can be placed and compared. The framework is
organised around the question of emotion causation. The aim is to highlight
what theories of emotion causation have in common and where they move
apart. Before looking at the explanations for emotion provided by various
theories, I briefly consider what it is that these theories try to explain. As
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I illustrate in the first section, disagreement among emotion theories already
starts here.
DEFINING EMOTION
Asked about a definition of emotions, many theorists start by listing a
number of components that they consider as being part of a prototypical
emotional episode. I use the term emotional episode to indicate anything
starting from the stimulus to the later components or the immediate
consequences of the emotion. The notion of emotional episode is thus
potentially broader than the notion of emotion. Examples of components
are: (a) a cognitive component; (b) a feeling component, referring to
emotional experience; (c) a motivational component, consisting of action
tendencies or states of action readiness (e.g., tendencies to flee or fight); (d) a
somatic component, consisting of central and peripheral physiological
responses; and (e) a motor component, consisting of expressive behaviour
(e.g., fight and flight and facial and vocal expressions). These components
correspond to functions such as: (a) stimulus evaluation or appraisal; (b)
monitoring (which may serve the further function of control or regulation);
(c) preparation and support of action; and (d) action. Table 1 depicts these
components with their corresponding functions.
It should be noted that within this list of components, the definitions of
the terms cognition and feeling is not unitary. The meaning of the term
cognition seems to shift depending on the category with which it is
contrasted. Cognition can be understood in the broad sense of the mental
when it is contrasted with somatic and motor responses. Several scholars
define mental processes as those that are mediated by representations.
Representations are functional notions invoked to explain variable stimulus
response relations. They come into the picture when a stimulus does not
invariably lead to the same response (with the same quality and intensity) at
different points in time and in different contexts (Bermude´z, 1995; Moors,
2007). Cognition is understood in a more narrow sense when it is contrasted
TABLE 1
Examples of components and corresponding functions
Components Functions
Cognitive Stimulus evaluation/appraisal
Feeling Monitoring0 regulation
Motivational
Preparation and support of actionSomatic
Motor Action
}
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with other mental concepts such as motivation and feeling. It has been
argued that goals are mentally represented but that they have special
dynamic qualities that are not shared by other kinds of representations (e.g.,
the activation of goal representations accumulates over time and persists in
the face of obstacles; Bargh & Barndollar, 1996). Thus, when contrasted with
motivation, cognition can be defined as based on non-dynamic representa-
tions. When contrasted with feeling, cognition can be defined in the narrow
philosophical sense of the Intentional1 part of the mental (Green, 1996).
Feeling corresponds to the phenomenal part of the mental. A mental state is
Intentional by virtue of being directed at or about something. It is
phenomenal by virtue of having irreducible qualia that are entirely subjective
(e.g., Block, 1995; Nagel, 1974).2 It is worth noting that there exist other
narrow views of cognition. One narrow view is that cognitive processes are
mediated by propositional representations (as opposed to perceptual ones,
see below). Another narrow view is that cognitive processes are non-
automatic (as opposed to automatic). A final narrow view is that cognitive
processes are rule-based (as opposed to associative). In sum, the cognitive
component can be understood in the broad sense of mental or in the more
narrow sense of non-dynamic, Intentional, propositional, non-automatic, or
rule based.
The component of feeling or emotional experience is sometimes under-
stood in the narrow sense of the phenomenal part of the mental (see above)
and sometimes in the broader sense of conscious experience, with both a
phenomenal and an Intentional aspect. Some authors even argue that
emotional experience only has an Intentional aspect. According to them,
emotional experience is about the other components in the emotional
episode (appraisal, action tendencies, and somatic and motor responses).
Emotion theorists disagree about the exact number and nature of the
components they include in the emotional episode. The definition of
components is one source of disagreement. For example, inclusion of a
cognitive component is more likely when cognition is defined in a broad than
in a narrow sense (cf. Lazarus, 1982, versus Zajonc, 1980). Needless to say,
there are many other sources of disagreement about the components to
include (cf. the special issue edited by Frijda, 2007, in Social Science
Information).
1 Following Searle (1983), I write Intentionality in philosophical use with a capital I and
intentionality in ordinary use with a lower case i.
2 A state can be directed at something by forming a representation of it. Thus, in this view,
cognitive processes also correspond to representation-mediated processes. Note that according
to this view, the mental is broader than the representational; it also includes phenomenal states
that are non-representational.
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Emotion theorists not only disagree about the components that they
include in the emotional episode, but also about the component(s) that they
include in or identify with the emotion (Prinz, 2004). Some theorists isolate
one (or a few) component(s) from the emotional episode and call it emotion.
For example, James (1890) equated emotion with the feeling component.
Frijda (1986) singled out the motivational component as the phenomenon to
be explained, equating emotions with states of action readiness. Several
theorists include all or most components of the emotional episode in their
definition of emotion (Clore & Centerbar, 2004; Scherer, 2005). It may be
noted that some theorists treat the motor component as a consequence of
emotion rather than as a part of it. Others distinguish between spontaneous
and planned behaviour, treating the former as a part of emotion and the
latter as a consequence.
Further, emotion theorists disagree about whether the components in the
emotional episode occur sequentially, and, if so, whether they occur in a
fixed order. Among those that accept a fixed order, there is disagreement
about the particular order proposed. Theorists who assume a fixed order and
who equate emotion with one component often consider the other
components in the episode as causes and consequences of the emotion.
Theorists who assume a fixed order and who equate emotion with the entire
emotional episode can still split the emotional episode in an antecedent and
a consequent part. It may be noted that the relation between sequentiality
and causality is an asymmetric relation. Causality implies sequentiality
(causes precede their effects), but sequentiality does not imply causality
(early parts precede late parts, but do not necessarily cause them).
Essential for a definition of emotion is that it demarcates emotions from
phenomena that are not emotions. I list a number of demarcation criteria
that have turned up in the literature. Some theorists exclude from the class of
emotions phenomena that lack one of the components that they consider
essential for emotions or the emotional episode. For example, reflexes (e.g.,
startle reflex) have been refused the status of emotions because they do not
have a cognitive component or because they bypass stimulus evaluation (cf.
Leventhal & Scherer, 1987). Sensory experiences such as feeling cold or pain
are not considered emotions because they are pure feelings that lack
Intentionality (they lack a cognitive component, defined in the philosophical
sense of the term). Attitudes and preferences have been excluded from the
class of emotions because they lack clear somatic and motor correlates
(Lang, 1985; Scherer, 2005).
It may be true that some components are necessary for emotion, yet no
component seems to be unique (Frijda, 2007; Parrott, 2007). Indeed,
cognition, feeling, motivation, and somatic and motor responses may be
present (even all at once) in phenomena that are not emotions. To illustrate
this, Frijda (2007) mentioned the example of a piece of soap that slips
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through one’s fingers under the shower and that leads to a shift in action
tendency, manifested in feeling, somatic responses, and the action of groping
for the soap. All the components are there, yet many authors will be unlikely
to categorise this as an emotional episode. Theorists have therefore proposed
additional criteria that may help set the boundaries of the class of emotions.
Some additional criteria have to do with the content of components. One
criterion specifies the content of the appraisal component. Appraisal
theorists have argued that emotions occur when a stimulus is appraised as
relevant and/or (in)congruent to a central goal (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991;
Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Moors, 2007; Scherer, 2005). In the soap
example, the event may be relevant only to a goal of minor importance.
Some theorists (even some appraisal theorists) have left the possibility open
that emotions arise when the stimulus is appraised as positive or negative,
independent of current goals (Frijda, 2007; Scherer, 2005, takes this to be the
case for the emotion disgust and for emotions elicited by music). A second
content criterion specifies the content of the experience component. Many
theorists have argued that the experience of an emotion must have a positive
or negative flavour (e.g., Ortony & Turner, 1990), thereby excluding neutral
states such as surprise and interest. Other additional criteria are based on
quantitative features. For example, Scherer (1984, 1993b) proposed that a
phenomenon can be called an emotion when all (or most) components are
recruited in a co-ordinated and synchronised manner. A final set of criteria
has been proposed to delineate emotions from moods. These include
duration (emotions: short; moods: long), intensity (emotions: high; moods:
low), and the presence or absence of a specific target (emotions: present;
moods: absent).
Emotion theorists not only disagree about the boundaries of the class of
emotions, they also disagree about how they think the class of emotions or
emotional phenomena should be internally structured. A first group of
theorists takes a limited set of emotions with a special status, called basic
emotions, as the building blocks of emotional life. Basic emotions can be
recombined or elaborated to form non-basic emotions. Members of this
group of theorists vary with regard to the number and identity of the
emotions they enumerate as basic. This is because they rely on different
criteria for inclusion and discrimination within this set. Examples of criteria
are that each basic emotion has a unique neural signature (Darwin, 1872/
1965; Ekman, 2007; Izard, 1977; Panksepp, 1982, 1998, 2000), a unique
pattern of appraisal values (e.g., Roseman, 1991), a unique action tendency
(Frijda, 1986), a unique physiological response pattern (Ekman, Levenson, &
Friesen, 1983), a unique facial expression (Ekman, 1984), and a unique
experiental quality (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). A second group of
theorists takes a small set of sub-emotional variables as the building blocks of
emotional life. Members of this group vary with regard to the number and
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nature of the variables they postulate. For example, several appraisal theorists
put forward six or more appraisal variables (e.g., novelty, valence, goal
relevance, goal congruence, coping potential, and agency). These variables
are conceived of as dimensional by some authors (e.g., Scherer, 1984, 1994)
and as discrete by others (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; see Roseman & Smith, 2001).
The combination of values on discrete/dimensional appraisal variables gives
rise to a large/infinite number of specific emotions. For another example,
Russell (2003) put forward the dimensional variables of valence and arousal.
These are variables of experience and neurophysiological activity. Contrary
to the appraisal variables mentioned above, however, Russell’s building
blocks do not combine to form specific emotions (see below).
Given the many ways in which emotion theories can differ, there are many
ways in which an overview of them can be organised. I choose to organise
theories according to their views of emotion causation, and, related to this,
the order in which they place emotional components within an emotional
episode. This means that I discuss only theories that have an explicit, unique
view of emotion causation. It also means that I compare the selected theories
especially with regard to their view of emotion causation. There are, of
course, other ways in which to organise an overview of emotion theories. One
could compare theories with regard to the way in which they structure the
class of emotional phenomena (into discrete emotions versus sub-emotional
variables; see above). One could also compare theories with regard to their
preferred research method. It is good to keep in mind that different principles
for organising overviews can lead to different groupings of theories.
EMOTION CAUSATION
The question about the cause of emotions is a question about what is
happening between the stimulus (the input) and the emotion (the output) or
between the stimulus and the consequent part of the emotional episode.
Ideally, an emotion theory that is concerned with emotion causation should
explain the observation that some but not all stimuli in the environment
elicit an emotion. I dub this ‘‘the elicitation problem’’ (Q1; Power &
Dalgleish, 2007, called it ‘‘the event problem’’). This problem subsumes two
subquestions. The first subquestion (Q1A) asks which stimuli elicit an
emotion and which stimuli do not. The second subquestion (Q1B) asks how
the organism determines this. It is a question about the mechanisms (and
representations) responsible for selecting the stimuli that elicit an emotion.
What else should a theory concerned with emotion causation explain,
besides the presence or absence of an emotion? It should also explain certain
characteristics of the emotion. As mentioned above, emotion theorists have
different definitions of emotion. They are thus likely to disagree about the
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to-be-explained characteristics of emotion. One way to escape from this
impasse is to look for very general characteristics that all or most emotion
theorists would agree on. I think that, at the very least, emotion theorists
agree that an emotion (as many other natural and artificial phenomena) has
quantity and quality. The quantity aspect refers to the intensity of an
emotion and varies from no intensity (and hence no emotion) to very high
intensity. The quality aspect, in a broad sense, refers to the valence (positive/
negative) of an emotion, and, in a narrow sense, to specific emotions such as
anger, fear, sadness, and joy (to name just a few). Theories concerned with
emotion causation should ideally explain variations in quantity and quality.
I refer to the quantity issue as ‘‘the intensity problem’’ (Q2), and to the
quality issue as ‘‘the differentiation problem’’ (Q3). The intensity problem
subsumes two subquestions: A first subquestion (Q2A) asks which stimuli
elicit weak emotions and which elicit strong ones. A second subquestion
(Q2B) asks about the mechanisms (and representations) that determine the
intensity of the ensuing emotion. It may be noted that the elicitation problem
can be seen as part of the intensity problem. The presence or absence of an
emotion can be considered as a matter of intensity: The absence of an
emotion can be situated at one extreme end of the intensity scale. The
differentiation problem can also be split into two subquestions: A first
subquestion (Q3A) asks which stimuli elicit positive emotions and which
elicit negative ones or (for theories that distinguish more specific emotions)
which stimuli elicit specific emotion such as anger, fear, sadness, and joy. A
second subquestion (Q3B) asks about the mechanisms (and representations)
that determine the quality of the ensuing emotion, the mechanisms that are
charged with differentiation in the broad or the narrow sense.
Relying on Marr’s (1982) proposal that processes can be described at
different levels of analysis, one can say that the set of subquestions about
stimuli (Q1A, Q2A, Q3A) and the set of subquestions about mechanisms
and representations (Q1B, Q2B, Q3B) are both concerned with the process
involved in emotion elicitation. They just deal with a different level of
process description. Marr (1982) taught us that processes can be described at
three levels of analysis. At the first, functional level, a process is described as
a relation between input and output; it is specified what the process does. At
this level can also be described the conditions under which the process
operates. At the second, algorithmic level, a process is described in terms of
the mechanisms that translate input into output. At this level can also be
specified the format of the representations (or codes) on which the
mechanisms operate. At the third, implementational level, the physical
realisation of the process in the brain is specified. This level deals with the
neurological structures, circuits, or networks involved. The subquestions
about the stimuli that elicit emotions (Q1A, Q2A, and Q3A) can be said to
deal with the functional level of process understanding: Stimuli are the
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input; emotions are the output. The subquestions about the underlying
mechanisms and representations (Q1B, Q2B, and Q3B) can be said to
address the algorithmic level. One could argue that a complete theory of
emotion causation should also address the third level of process under-
standing, and several theories have addressed this level. In the present
overview, however, the focus is mostly (but not exclusively) on the first two
levels (see Table 2). Theories concerned with emotion causation can differ in
two important ways. First, they can diverge on the set of questions (A, B, C)
and hence the level of process description (functional, algorithmic,
implementational) that they address. Second, they can address the same
set of questions but provide radically different answers.
I review a selection of emotion theories (some are families) that have made
claims about the causation of emotion. Because of the growing interdisci-
plinary contacts among psychologists and philosophers, I have chosen not to
restrict the overview to well-known psychological theories, but to also include
dominant philosophical theories.3 The theories discussed are: (T1) James’
(1890) theory; (T2) Schachter’s (1964) theory; (T3) appraisal theories; (T4)
network theories; (T5) affect program theory; (T6) Barrett’s (2006b)
conceptual act theory; (T7) philosophical cognitivism; and (T8) philosophi-
cal perceptual theories.4 The order in which these theories are discussed is
partly determined by historical considerations (because later theories build
on the insights developed by older theories and sometimes present solutions
to problems of older theories) but not entirely so (several theories developed
more or less in parallel, and most of them have early roots).
Examination of these theories shows that most of them assume that some
kind of processing is involved in emotion elicitation. Theories differ with
regard to the kind of processing that they propose. In this respect, it is worth
pointing at three differences. A first difference has to do with the conditions
3 In the present paper, the distinction between philosophical and psychological theories is
based on the background of their authors and on a difference in approach that can be traced
back to a difference in starting point. Philosophers often start from the structure of language in
the hope of learning something about the structure of reality. Psychologists often start from the
observation of reality. I further wish to note that I use the term theory in a liberal sense to
indicate any internally coherent collection of hypotheses, regardless of whether these hypotheses
have been submitted to empirical testing.
4 The theories of Schachter (1964) and Barrett (2006b) have often been grouped together in
the family of two-factor or constructivist theories, and James’ (1890) theory has sometimes been
added as the precursor of this tradition. In the present paper, I chose to discuss these theories
separately because they occupy radically different positions on the criteria that I have set out to
organise this review. James can indeed be considered as a precursor of Schachter, but both
propose different components for the differentiation of emotions. Barrett’s theory is undeniably
a two-factor theory like Schachter’s, but Barrett also builds on insights developed by appraisal
theories. As a result, the processes that Barrett proposes for the elicitation of emotions differ
from those proposed by Schachter in several important respects (see below).
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TABLE 2
Overview of questions that should be addressed by theories of emotion causation, linked to Marr’s levels of analysis
Problems related to emotion causation
Marr’s levels of process description Question 1: Elicitation Question 2: Intensity Question 3: Differentiation
A. Functional level: Relation
between input and output
Question 1A: Question 2A: Question 3A:
Which stimuli elicit emotions and
which do not?
Which stimuli elicit weak versus
strong emotions?
Which stimuli elicit positive versus
negative emotions? (anger, fear,
sadness, joy, etc.)
What are the conditions under
which emotions are elicited
B. Algorithmic level: Mechanisms and
format of representations (codes)
Question 1B: Question 2B: Question 3B:
What are the mechanisms and
representations that determine
emotion elicitation?
What are the mechanisms and
representations that determine the
intensity of emotions?
What are the mechanisms and
representations that determine the
quality of emotions?
C. Implementational level:
Neurological structures or routes
Question 1C: Question 2C: Question 3C:
What is the neurological basis of
emotion elicitation?
What is the neurological basis of
emotion intensity?
What is the neurological basis of
emotion differentiation?
Note: The C-questions are not discussed in the present paper.
E
M
O
T
IO
N
C
A
U
S
A
T
IO
N
6
3
3
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
e
i
t
 
G
e
n
t
]
 
A
t
:
 
1
4
:
5
7
 
1
8
 
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
 
2
0
0
9
under which they think emotion-eliciting processes can operate. Some
theories (e.g., T2 and T7) assume that the processes involved in emotion
causation are non-automatic (i.e., conscious, controlled, non-efficient, and/or
slow) whereas others (e.g., T3, T4, T5, T6, and T8) emphasise that they can
also be automatic (i.e., unconscious, uncontrolled, efficient, and/or fast). As
argued by Bargh (e.g., 1989; see also Moors & De Houwer, 2006a, 2006b)
automaticity has to do with the conditions under which a process is able to
operate. A process is automatic when it operates under suboptimal conditions
(such as when there is subliminal stimulus input, no goal to engage in the
process, a goal to counteract the process, a lack of attentional capacity, and/or
a lack of time); a process is non-automatic when it only operates under
optimal conditions (such as when there is supraliminal stimulus input, the
goal to engage in the process, no goal to counteract the process, abundant
attentional capacity, and/or abundant time).
A second difference among theories of emotion causation has to do with
the format of the representations they put forward. Some theories (e.g., T7)
hold that emotions are elicited by mechanisms operating on propositional
representations whereas others (e.g., T3, T4, T5, T6, and T8) argue that they
can also be elicited by mechanisms operating on perceptual representations.
It is important to note that various authors have characterised the
distinction between propositional and perceptual representations in different
ways. Some authors state that propositional representations are verbal-like
or abstract whereas perceptual representations are image-like in that they
contain concrete modality-specific sensory features (e.g., Barrett, 2006b).
Others state that propositional representations are mental contents to which
one ascribes truth value, whereas perceptual representations are mental
contents that one entertains without necessarily believing them (Charland,
1997). Still others stress that propositional, but not perceptual, representa-
tions have a similar compositional structure as propositions. Propositions
are composed of meaningful parts that can be recombined to form new
propositions (e.g., Fodor, 1980; but see Bermude´z, 1995).
A third difference among theories of emotion causation has to do with the
object or input of the emotion-eliciting process. In most theories, the input of
the crucial process is the stimulus. In the theories of James (1890) and
Schachter (1964), however, the input of the crucial process is the physical
responses of the person to the stimulus. Barrett’s (2006b) theory gives equal
weight to one process that has the stimulus as its input and another process
that has the output of the other process (i.e., an experience) as its input.
As mentioned, theories of emotion causation not always propose different
kinds of processes; they sometimes just differ with regard to the levels of
process understanding that they address. Many theories are concerned with
the algorithmic level (T3, T4, and T6, and to some extent T7 and T8) and
some with the implementational level (T1, T5, and T6, and some theories in
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T3 and T4). Only few theories (T3, and to some extent T7) seriously address
the functional level. In the next sections, the selected theories are discussed
one by one. The aim is to identify the components that theories invoke to
solve the problems of elicitation (Q1), intensity (Q2), and differentiation
(Q3), and to report on the order in which they place components within a
prototypical emotional episode. Another aim is to detail the above claim that
theories differ with regard to the kind of processing they propose (i.e.,
conditions, format of representations, and object) and the levels of process
description they address (functional, algorithmic, and implementational).
It is worth reiterating that theories of emotion causation differ with
regard to the component(s) that they identify with the emotion and hence
the phenomenon they set out to explain. Some theories equate emotion with
a single component, such as the feeling component (T1 and T2) or the
cognitive component (members of T7 and T8). Other theories take emotion
to be a syndrome composed of several components such as feelings,
cognition, motivation, somatic and/or motor responses (most members of
T3, T4, and T5).
JAMES’ THEORY
According to James (1884, 1890) a stimulus activates the sensory cortex,
which directly (or in some unspecified way) elicits peripheral somatic and/or
motor responses. Feedback of these bodily responses returns to the sensory
cortex where it produces emotional experience (Figure 1). Emotional
experience is nothing but the conscious experience of bodily responses.
James equated emotion with emotional experience (i.e., the feeling compo-
nent) so his theory has been called a feeling theory. James’ theory was
revolutionary at the time because it turned around the conventional order of
events within an emotional episode. Whereas folk theory assumed that
emotional experience precedes bodily responses (‘‘we run/tremble because
we feel afraid’’), James postulated that bodily responses precede emotional
experience (‘‘we feel afraid because we run/tremble’’). It is fair to note that
before James, Descartes (1644/1998) had already proposed this order of
events to occur within an emotional episode.
In James’ (1890) theory, both the intensity (Q2A) and the quality (Q3A)
of emotions are determined by the intensity and quality of the bodily
Somatic/Motor c. Feeling c.
Stimulus → Bodily responses → Experience of bodily responses = Emotional experience = Emotion
Figure 1. Order of components in James’ theory.
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responses (i.e., the somatic and motor components) that occur in response to
the stimulus. The quality of the emotion is determined by the specific
response pattern elicited by the stimulus. Each specific emotion has its own
response signature. An important shortcoming is that James does not
explain how bodily responses are produced in the first place. In other words,
he does not address the elicitation problem (Q1).
James’ (1890) theory has been criticised on empirical and theoretical
grounds. On the empirical side, Cannon (1927) argued: (a) that the
autonomous responses that accompany specific emotions lack specificity
(e.g., both anger and fear come with increased heart rates); (b) that artificial
induction of physical arousal (e.g., by injection of adrenalin) does not produce
real emotions; and (c) that disconnection of peripheral organs from the central
nervous system (disrupting feedback) does not eliminate emotions. After
Cannon, renewed interest has arisen for each of these issues, but there is
currently no consensus (Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito,
2000; Christie & Friedman, 2004; Chwalisz, Diener, & Gallagher, 1988;
Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Levenson, 1992; Levenson, Ekman, &
Friesen, 1990; see Barrett, 2006a, 2006b; Cornelius, 1996; Niedenthal,
Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2006, for reviews; see also, the rise of neo-Jamesian
theories, e.g., Damasio, 1994; Prinz, 2004). The theoretical criticism was that
James (1890) reduced emotions to experiences of bodily responses and
therefore failed to account for the fact that emotions have Intentional objects
(e.g., Solomon, 1976). For example, sadness is not just the experience of a
pattern of bodily responses. It is also about something, for example, about the
fact that something valuable is lost forever.
SCHACHTER’S THEORY
Schachter (1964) reconciled James’ (1890) notion that somatic responses
precede emotional experience with Cannon’s (1927) criticism that these
responses lack specificity and are therefore not capable of bringing forth
specific emotions. Schachter’s theory is a two-factor or two-step theory. In the
first step, stimulus input produces an undifferentiated state of physiological
arousal.5 In the second step, the arousal is interpreted in light of the
characteristics of that input. It is this cognitive process of attribution of
arousal to the presumed cause of the arousal that produces a specific
5 Two different meanings of the term arousal circulate in emotion literature. In the first sense,
arousal refers to physical arousal (i.e., the somatic component). In the second sense, arousal
refers to intensity (activationdeactivation) and can be a property of several components (e.g.,
the feeling component).
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emotional experience (see Figure 2). Like James, Schachter equated emotion
with emotional experience (i.e., the feeling component).
The degree of arousal (i.e., the somatic component) determines the intensity
of the emotion (Q2) whereas the additional element of attribution (i.e., the
cognitive component) provides the quality of the emotion (Q3). Attribution of
arousal to different eliciting events produces different emotions. Initially, the
confrontation with a dangerous dog and the reunion with a beloved person
cause similar physical arousal. It is only after attribution of this arousal to the
danger versus the reunion that an emotion of fear versus joy is elicited.
Schachter and Singer (1962) supported their view with an experiment in which
injections of adrenaline (causing physical arousal) led to joy versus anger
depending on whether they were in the presence of a happy versus angry
bystander. It was assumed that the bystander’s emotion led participants to
interpret their own arousal as joy versus anger.
Within the prevailing scientific climate, Schachter’s (1964) cognitive
attribution process was conceived of as a conscious process, as if physical
arousal can be coloured in an arbitrary manner by conscious thoughts.
Although Schachter built in a cognitive component in charge of emotion
differentiation, he did not specify a component that determines which
stimuli lead to arousal in the first place. The cognitive component does not
precede arousal and therefore cannot determine which stimuli elicit arousal
(and hence an emotion) and which do not. In other words, the theory fails to
address the elicitation problem (Q1).
Critics have challenged the empirical evidence for Schachter’s theory (see
Reisenzein, 1983, for a review) as well as the theory itself (Zajonc, 1980).
Zajonc argued against Schachter’s (1964) idea that cognition is a necessary
cause of emotions. Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) demonstrated that mere
(repeated) exposure to stimuli led to an increase in liking of those stimuli, even
when the stimuli were presented subliminally so that conscious identification
of them was not possible. This and other arguments led Zajonc to conclude
that cognition is unnecessary for affect.6 Appraisal theories of emotion
  Somatic c.          Cognitive c.            Feeling c. 
Stimulus → Physiological arousal → Attribution of arousal → Emotional experience = Emotion 
Figure 2. Order of components in Schachter’s theory.
6 Zajonc (1980) claimed that cognition is unnecessary for affect (by which he meant raw
positivenegative quality or valence), but not that cognition is unnecessary for full-blown
specific emotions. His data are nevertheless relevant for theories concerned with emotion
causation, at least for those theories that conceive of affect as a minimal form of emotion or as
an early step in emotion causation (e.g., Barrett, 2005; Scherer, 1984).
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envisaged another solution for the problem raised by the data of Kunst-
Wilson and Zajonc. These theories are discussed in the next section.
APPRAISAL THEORIES
Appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus,
1966, 1991; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988;
Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose´, 1996; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985)
retained Schachter’s (1964) idea that cognition is an antecedent of emotion,
but they no longer equated cognition with conscious cognition. These
theorists suggested that much of the cognitive work involved in the
elicitation of emotion is unconscious or otherwise automatic (e.g., Arnold,
1960; Scherer, 2001, 2004). Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc’s (1980) data showed
that conscious cognition is unnecessary for emotion or affect, but not that
unconscious cognition is unnecessary. Arnold (1960) coined the term
appraisal to refer to the cognitive process involved in emotion elicitation,
and, accordingly, theories in this tradition have been dubbed appraisal
theories.
Appraisal theories also differ from Schachter (1964) in that they place the
cognitive component at the very onset of the emotional episode (after the
stimulus), prior to bodily responses. Thus, the cognitive component can be
invoked as the one that determines which stimuli lead to an emotion and
which do not (cf. elicitation problem, Q1). This component also determines
which emotion should be produced (cf. differentiation problem, Q3) and
how intense it should be (cf. intensity problem, Q2; see below). Further,
appraisal theories shift Schachter’s conscious attribution process to the end
of the emotion episode. Thus, unconscious appraisal of stimuli takes place
prior to the emotion whereas conscious attribution of the emotion to a cause
and/or labelling of the emotion (e.g., as fear or anger) takes place after the
emotion. It is important to note that the crucial distinction between
emotion-antecedent appraisal and emotion-consequent attribution is not
so much the nature of the cognitive operations involved (appraisal can
include causal attribution, cf. the appraisal variable of agency) or the
degree to which they are conscious (both can probably be conscious or
unconscious), but the object or input of these processes. In the case
of emotion-antecedent appraisal, the input is the stimulus; in the case of
emotion-consequent attribution, the input is the emotion.
It is somewhat precarious to detail the order of the remaining
components within the emotional episode because there is divergence among
appraisal theories. By way of illustration, I present a much-cited order (see
Figure 3). Appraisal of the stimulus causes an action tendency (i.e., the
motivational component). The action tendency can be manifested in
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physiological responses (i.e., the somatic component), which prepare and
support the occurrence of behaviour (i.e., the motor component). Emotional
experience (i.e., the feeling component) is often considered as the totality of
the traces that all the other components leave in consciousness. Thus, it is
difficult to picture emotional experience as a separate phase in the emotional
episode.
Contemporary appraisal theorists (e.g., Scherer, 2001) have proposed
refinements to the sequence of components presented above. I mention three
refining assumptions. First, organisms always occupy some value on the
components proposed. Thus, a sequence of components is actually a
sequence of changes in these components. Second, the processes involved
in one component need not be entirely completed before they can initiate
changes in subsequent components. For example, partial completion of the
appraisal component can already trigger changes in the components of
action tendencies, responses, and experience. Third, the changes caused in
subsequent components feed back into prior components. This is called
recurrence. For example, changes in response components feed back into the
appraisal component, causing re-appraisal. It may be noted that these
refinements are not incompatible with the sequence of components
presented above. Despite the fact that at any point in time, several recurrent
cycles are running simultaneously so that the processes in several compo-
nents occur in parallel, the order within each cycle is fixed. In each cycle,
stimuli must be appraised before they lead to action tendencies and
responses.
Appraisal theories have traditionally focused on the first subquestion of
the problems of elicitation, intensity, and differentiation. They have
addressed the questions of which stimuli elicit an emotion versus no emotion
(Q1A), which stimuli elicit weak versus strong emotions (Q2A), and which
stimuli elicit which specific emotions (Q3A). Several appraisal theories have
also addressed the second subquestion about the mechanisms and repre-
sentations involved in the elicitation (Q1B), intensity (Q2B), and differentia-
tion (Q3B) of emotions. In trying to develop hypotheses regarding the
A-Questions, appraisal theorists have quickly come to the conclusion that it
Cognitive c. Motivational c. Somatic c. Motor c.
Stimulus →Appraisal of stimulus → Action tendency → Physiological responses → (Behaviour) → (Attribution/labelling of emotion)
Emotional experience
Feeling c.
= Emotion
Figure 3. Order of components in appraisal theories.
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is impossible to make a fixed list of stimuli that elicit an emotion (or an
emotion of the same intensity and quality) in all people or on all occasions.
They have emphasised that there are few if any one-to-one relations between
specific stimuli and specific emotions (Roseman & Smith, 2001). The same
emotion can be produced by very different stimuli, and the same stimulus
can lead to different emotions in different individuals or on different
occasions. For example, anger can be produced by an insult, a computer
crash, or by accidentally hitting one’s head against the kitchen cabinet. A
computer crash can lead to anger in one person or on one occasion, but to
fear or panic in another person or on another occasion. Appraisal theorists
have tried to discover the commonalities among stimuli that elicit emotions
(or the same ones) and the differences among stimuli that do and those that
do not elicit emotions (or different ones). As a result of this exercise, they
have come up with a set of appraisal variables. Each variable deals with one
aspect of the encounter. The values on these variables combine to form an
appraisal pattern. It is assumed that each specific emotion is caused by a
unique appraisal pattern. I now turn to a discussion of a few important
appraisal variables.
A first variable is goal relevance. A stimulus elicits an emotion when it is
goal relevant, that is when it provides information about the satisfaction
status of a goal or concern. Emotions are reliably caused by constellations of
stimuli and goals. For example, hearing a noise in the hall at night is not
inherently emotion provoking; it is only so because it is relevant for one’s
goal for physical safety (it might indicate that a violent robber is trying to
break into the house). The variable of goal relevance is also responsible for
the intensity of emotions. The more important the goal at stake, the stronger
the ensuing emotion. A second variable is goal congruence. Specific
emotions are not evoked by specific classes of stimuli but instead by specific
classes of constellations of stimuli and goals. A constellation of a match
between a stimulus and a goal leads to a positive emotion whereas a
constellation of a mismatch leads to a negative emotion, irrespective of the
specific stimuli or the specific goals at stake. A noise in the hall elicits a
negative emotion when it constitutes a mismatch with one’s goal for physical
safety, but so does any stimulus that constitutes a mismatch with some goal.
Appraisal theorists have identified a number of other variables such as
certainty, coping potential, and agency/blame for the further breakdown of
positive and negative emotions into more specific emotions such as joy,
hope, pride, anger, fear, and sadness. Examples of hypotheses developed by
appraisal theorists are that anger and sadness are elicited by an actual
mismatch, whereas fear occurs in response to a pending mismatch (Arnold,
1960), that events are more easy to cope with in the case of anger than in the
cases of fear and sadness (Scherer, 1988), and that anger occurs when the
mismatch is caused by an animate agent, especially when it was on purpose
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(Lazarus, 1991; but see Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004). In sum, the
appraisal variable of goal relevance is appraisal theory’s solution to the
problems of elicitation (Q1A) and intensity (Q2A). The remaining appraisal
variables (goal congruence, coping potential, agency/blame) provide a
solution to the differentiation problem (Q3A).
Despite a fair degree of overlap, individual appraisal theories disagree
about the precise number and identity of the appraisal variables that they
include. According to Scherer (1999), part of the disagreement stems from
differences in the number and identity of the emotions that appraisal
theories set out to explain. A theory that tries to explain anger, fear, sadness,
and joy needs less appraisal variables than a theory that also tries to explain
surprise, disgust, shame, jealousy, pride, and guilt. Scherer ascribes another
part of the disagreement to methatheoretical choices. Some theories put
emphasis on parsimony, restricting their list of variables to the necessary and
sufficient ones (or even the typical ones); others put emphasis on
exhaustivity, trying to explain the greatest variety within emotion categories,
such as different shades of anger and fear. There is also disagreement about
the precise appraisal patterns that they postulate for each emotion. For
example, some appraisal theorists consider the appraisal variable of agency/
blame as necessary for anger (e.g., Lazarus, 1991) whereas others do not
(e.g., Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001).
Appraisal researchers have investigated hypotheses about the relation
between specific appraisal patterns and specific emotions, using self-report
methods as their primary source (e.g., Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1993b, 1997;
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Participants have been
asked, for instance, to recall how they appraised a particular emotion-
evoking event or to imagine which emotion they would feel given certain
appraisals. The use of self-report for discovering appraisals involved in
emotion causation has been the target of severe criticism (e.g., Davidson,
1992; Parkinson & Manstead, 1992). Apart from the limited evidential value
of correlative studies for causal relations, self-report data have been
characterised as an unreliable source for gaining insight in automatic
processes. Given the assumption that appraisal is assumed to be automatic
most of the time, it is unlikely that it would be available for self-report.
Appraisal theorists (e.g., Frijda, 1993; Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001; Lazarus,
1991; Scherer, 1993a) are aware of the limitations of self-report studies. They
acknowledge that self-report data are an unreliable source for tracing the
actual appraisal variables involved in emotion causation. They suspect
instead that the appraisal patterns found in their studies reveal the structure
of the content of emotional experience (e.g., Frijda, 1993; Scherer, 1993a)
or that they reflect post hoc causal attributions (Nisbet & Wilson,
1977; Parkinson & Manstead, 1992; Rime´, Philippot, & Cisamolo, 1990;
Robinson & Clore, 2002). Such attributions are often based on stereotypic
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scripts about the relation between appraisals and emotions. Participants may
be particularly encouraged to draw from stereotypic scripts because of the
fact that self-report studies make use of emotion words. Asked about the
cause of an emotion labelled as fear, participants may mention an event
appraised as dangerous (threatening the goal of safety) because they make
use of the stereotypic script according to which fear occurs in response to
danger (Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001; Izard, 1993). To break out of this
circularity, several authors have proposed to abandon the use of emotion
words and to change the dependent variable from emotional experience to
action tendencies (Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001), physiological response
patterns (Pecchinenda, 2001), or behavioural responses (such as vocal and
facial expressions; Johnstone, van Reekum, & Scherer, 2001; Kaiser &
Wehrle, 2001). These other correlates of emotions have the advantage that
they are logically independent of appraisal and that they suffer less from the
influence of stereotypic scripts (Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001).
As pointed out above, appraisal theories address the functional level of
process understanding. Their aim is to understand the relation between
specific appraisal patterns and specific emotions. They are guided by the
question of which information is minimally or typically processed before
specific emotions occur. Several appraisal theorists have also ventured
hypotheses about the algorithmic level of process understanding
(B-Questions). Most of them propose a dual-mode (or multi-mode) model.
They put forward two (sometimes three) mechanisms for emotion elicitation:
one is rule based, the other is associative (e.g., Clore & Ortony, 2000;
Smith & Kirby, 2000, 2001; Teasdale, 1999; van Reekum & Scherer, 1997; see
Smith & Neumann, 2005, for a review). Rule-based mechanisms compute
the values for individual appraisal variables and combine them in order to
select the appropriate emotion. The associative mechanism corresponds to
the retrieval or reinstatement of previously computed and stored appraisal
patterns. Some theorists add a third mechanism: the activation of innate
sensory-motor connections (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987). A limited set of
stimuli (e.g., faces, loud noise, and sudden loss of support) is thought to have
the innate capacity to elicit emotional responses. Other theorists refuse to
stretch the notion of appraisal so that it includes the activation of sensory-
motor connections.
Advocates of multi-mode models have made a priori assumptions about
(a) the format of the representations that serve as the input to these
mechanisms and (b) the conditions under which these mechanisms can
operate. The rule-based mechanism is said to operate on propositional
representations and the associative mechanism on perceptual representa-
tions (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; but see Smith & Kirby, 2001). Sensory-
motor connections can be triggered by sensory features that are not
yet integrated into a perceptual representation. To the extent that the
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sensory-motor mechanism is not mediated by representations, it falls out of
the cognitive realm. The rule-based mechanism is said to be flexible but non-
automatic; the activation of learned and innate stimulusemotion connec-
tions is said to be rigid (and hence more error prone) but automatic (Clore &
Ortony, 2000; Smith & Kirby, 2001; but see Moors, 2008). For example,
when processing conditions are optimal, hearing an insulting remark may
cause a person to weigh the implications of the event for her/his goals and
the possibilities for taking action. When processing conditions are sub-
optimal, however, the person has to rely on memory recordings of previous
insults and the associated appraisal pattern. The associative mechanism that
figures in multi-mode models of emotion causation is highly reminiscent of
the mechanism for emotion elicitation proposed by network theories of
emotion. It is to network theories that I now turn.
NETWORK THEORIES
Network theories of emotion (e.g., Berkowitz, 1990; Bower, 1981; Lang,
1985; Leventhal, 1980, 1984) have their roots in associative models from the
conditioning literature and semantic network models from the memory
literature. Common to all network theories is the assumption that emotions
are recorded in memory and that activation of these recordings is the
principal cause of emotions (Q1). Network models assume that initially only
a handful of biologically relevant stimuli elicit unconditioned emotional
responses and that the range of stimuli that evoke these emotional responses
is progressively elaborated through conditioning procedures (Martin &
Levey, 1978). When an emotional episode takes place, information about the
stimulus, action tendencies, and responses (in all models), as well as about
conceptual meaning and emotional experience (in some models) is encoded
in memory in distinct nodes. For each specific emotion, these nodes are
organised in a schema (Leventhal, 1980) or a network structure (Bower,
1981; Lang, 1985). A newly encountered, neutral stimulus acquires emotion-
eliciting power through repeated pairings with a stimulus that was already
represented in memory as part of an emotional schema. The (consistent) co-
occurrence in time and space of the new stimulus with the old stimulus is
sufficient for the new stimulus to become associated with the same schema
(i.e., learning). In this way, existing schemata are elaborated. On a later
occasion, when the new stimulus is encountered in isolation, the associated
schema is activated (i.e., retrieval) and an emotion ensues.
Schemata may be triggered by stimuli that are either identical or similar
to the ones represented in the schema (i.e., generalisation). Another
characteristic of schemata or networks is that they may be activated via
different entry points. An emotion schema can be activated via stimuli, but
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also via responses, for instance, when emotion-specific facial expressions are
mimicked (e.g., Lang, 1994; cf. facial feedback hypothesis). Note that if
responses are to trigger the schema for one specific emotion in an
unambiguous way, there must be a unique response pattern for that
emotion. The debate about the existence of emotion-specific response
patterns is thus also important for network theories (at least for their
assumption that schema’s can be activated via responses).
There is no consensus about whether, during learning or acquisition, the
creation of an associative link between the old and the new stimulus requires
anything beyond the mere co-occurrence in time and space of these stimuli.
Some investigators claim that persons must also be aware of this co-
occurrence (e.g., Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 2007; Shanks &
Dickinson, 1990) whereas others posit that awareness is not always required
(Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990). With respect to retrieval or
deployment, on the other hand, there is general consensus that both the
activation of an emotion schema and the further spreading of activation
among the nodes within the schema can take place in an unconscious (and
otherwise automatic) fashion. The content of a node becomes conscious
when the strength of activation in this node exceeds a certain threshold.
Network activation is regarded as a form of cognition (if cognition is
understood in the broad sense of representation-mediated processing). Thus,
in network theories, emotions are elicited by the cognitive component (cf.
elicitation problem, Q1). The quality of the emotion is also delivered by the
cognitive component (cf. differentiation problem, Q3). A stimulus activates
the stored emotional schema of a previously encountered stimulus to which
it is most similar. The intensity of the emotion is determined by the strength
of activation of the schema (cf. intensity problem, Q2). Network activation is
a mechanism (i.e., an associative mechanism), to be situated on the
algorithmic level of process understanding. In other words, network theories
address the second subquestion of the problems of elicitation (Q1B),
intensity (Q2B), and differentiation (Q3B). They are less concerned with
the first subquestion of these problems, which is to know which stimuli elicit
emotions (Q1A), which stimuli elicit strong versus weak emotions (Q2A),
and which stimuli lead to which specific emotions (Q3A). From a purely
associative point of view, each stimulus should be capable of eliciting any
emotion (except perhaps a limited set of unconditioned stimuli; O¨hman &
Mineka, 2001). Whether or not a stimulus elicits an emotion, and which one,
is entirely dependent on the other stimuli with which the stimulus was
previously paired. This does not seem very plausible. Purely associative
models probably meet their limits here. Most network theories (e.g., Lang,
1994; Teasdale, 1999) therefore leave room for a rule-based mechanism that
computes the values of stimuli on a number of variables, much like the
variables proposed in appraisal theories. They thus present a multi-mode
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view similar to that discussed in the section on appraisal theories (see also
the joint publication of Leventhal and Scherer, 1987).
At the time that network theories of emotion were first developed, the
computational metaphor of the mind ruled. Recent theories of emotion
elicitation that are based on the connectionist or dynamic systems metaphor
of the mind (e.g., Lewis, 2005) can be considered modern variants of
network theory. In both classic and new network theories, the central
mechanism for emotion elicitation is associative. In classic networks models,
an emotion is represented as a schema, in which each constitutive
component has a separate localist representation (i.e., a node). The
assumption that the schema can be activated via different entry points
(stimulus side, response side) gives the impression that network activation is
a sequential affair. In network models inspired by connectionism or dynamic
systems theory, components are represented in distributed form and multiple
components can be activated in parallel. These components constrain each
other mutually (with numerous feedback loops) until a stable solution
emerges.
AFFECT PROGRAM THEORY
Emotion causation has to do with the part ranging from the stimulus to the
emotion or the consequent part of the emotion. This part can further be
subdivided in a part in which evaluation of the stimulus takes place and a
part in which evaluation of the stimulus is translated into the (other)
components of the emotion (see also Reisenzein, 2001). The first part is the
traditional territory of appraisal theories. Affect program theory (e.g.,
Ekman, 1992, 2007; Izard, 1977; Panksepp, 1998, 2000; Tomkins, 1962)
proposes a hypothesis about the second part, a hypothesis that is situated,
moreover, on the implementational level. The hypothesis is that each basic
emotion has a unique neural circuit (or other neural signature). These
circuits are said to be installed by evolution to serve specific adaptational
functions. For example, the neural circuit of fear serves survival whereas the
neural circuit of anger serves territorial concerns. A neural circuit is
triggered when it receives an input of a certain nature. Specification of the
nature of this input is left to other theories (or it is similar to what other
theories have proposed). Ekman (1992), for example, accepts that neural
circuits are triggered by prior appraisals (in the multi-modal sense). In the
default case, once the neural circuit of a specific emotion is triggered, it runs
to completion and gives rise to specific action tendencies, specific responses,
and specific emotional experience. The default case obtains when activation
of the neural circuit exceeds a certain threshold and when counteracting
influences are either absent or not strong enough (cf. Ekman, 1992). Affect
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program theory is intrinsically dedicated to the view that basic emotions are
the building blocks of emotional life (the principle for inclusion and
discrimination being the existence of a unique neural substrate; see above).
Evidence adduced in support of affect program theory is either direct or
indirect (see Ortony & Turner, 1990, for a review). Direct evidence is
neurological evidence for the existence of emotion-specific neural circuits
(e.g., Panksepp, 1998, 2000). Examples of indirect evidence are: (a) evidence
for the existence of emotion-specific responses (e.g., facial expressions and
physiological response patterns; e.g., Ekman, 1972; Ekman, Levenson, &
Friesen, 1983); (b) evidence that these emotion-specific responses are
universal (Ekman, 1972); and (c) evidence for a high degree of co-ordination
among the various components of each specific emotion. It may be noted
that in the case of indirect evidence, research on the consequent part of
emotions is used to support assumptions about the antecedent part.
Affect program theory only speaks about the implementational level of
the second part of emotion causation. It is therefore in principle compatible
with the previous theories discussed. James’ (1890) notion of emotion-
specific response patterns is easily reconcilable with affect programs (cf.
Damasio’s, 1999, neo-Jamesian theory). Appraisal theorists could agree that
specific appraisal patterns trigger specific affect programs. Network theorists
could agree that some associations in the network are hard-wired whereas
others are added as a result of learning (e.g., Lewis, 2005). On the other
hand, these other theories are also compatible with the alternative view that
the neural circuitry underlying emotions is not organised into emotion-
specific modules, but rather into structures that are specific to sub-emotional
variables (Ortony & Turner, 1990). These brain structures are not developed
uniquely for emotions but are shared with other psychological functions. For
example, certain brain structures are involved in approach and avoidance
behaviour, regardless of whether this behaviour is emotional or not.
According to some appraisal theories (e.g., Scherer, 2001), appraisal
variables induce parts of action tendencies, leading to parts of physiological
response patterns and parts of expressive behaviour. James and classic
network theories assume that each emotion has a unique response pattern.
This does not force them, however, to accept that the number of response
patterns*and hence the number of emotions*is limited to six.
BARRETT’S CONCEPTUAL ACT THEORY
Barrett’s (2006b) conceptual act theory builds on Russell’s (2003) core affect
theory. Russell contested the assumption held by affect program theory that
basic emotions are the building blocks of emotional life, casting doubt on
both direct and indirect evidence for the existence of affect programs (e.g.,
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Russell, 1994; see also Barrett, 2006b; Russell & Barrett, 1999). Instead, he
put forward the sub-emotional variables of valence and arousal as the
building blocks of emotional life. These variables can be considered as
properties of stimuli, properties of neurophysiological states, and properties
of conscious experience. Stimuli vary on the dimensional variables of valence
and arousal. The combination of values on both variables is called ‘‘affective
quality’’. The affective quality of stimuli causes in the person a state called
‘‘core affect’’, which has both a neurophysiological side (i.e., valence and
arousal are associated with distinct neural systems) and a mental side (i.e.,
the conscious experience of affective quality; Russell & Barrett, 1999). Thus,
the building blocks of emotional life combine to form core affect but not
specific emotions. According to Russell, what traditional theories call
specific emotions is nothing but the categorisation of core affect into one
of the so-called emotion categories (e.g., anger, fear, sadness, and joy). These
categories are not given in nature (i.e., natural kinds) but are socio-cultural
constructions (i.e., artefacts). Russell’s theory has accordingly been dubbed a
constructivist theory. It may be noted that Russell not only rejects that
individual basic emotions are natural kinds, but also that the entire class of
specific emotions is a natural kind.
Barrett (2006b) agrees with Russell (2003) that basic emotions and the
class of specific emotions are not natural kinds. She disagrees, however, with
his premise that a phenomenon merits explanation only when it is filed as a
natural kind. Even if specific emotions are artefacts, they still require an
explanation. In line with Russell, Barrett proposes a two-factor theory. In
one factor, stimuli elicit core affect; in another factor, core affect is
categorised. Unlike Russell, however, Barrett does not picture the categor-
isation of core affect as something that happens after experience, but rather
as something that helps shape the experience (see Figure 4). In Barrett’s
theory, the end result is a specific emotional experience.
Barrett conceives of the categorisation of core affect as a form of
perception. She emphasises that perception is influenced by previously
acquired conceptual knowledge. This is why she sometimes uses the term
conceptual act to refer to the categorisation of core affect. Barrett draws an
      Cognitive c.    Somatic c.  Feeling c. + Somatic c. 
Stimulus → Appraisal and/or physical process → Core affect
   Categorisation of core affect  
→ Emotional experience 
Feeling c. 
Cognitive c. 
Figure 4. Order of components in Barrett’s theory.
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analogy between the categorisation process in emotion perception and
colour perception. The retina registers light of different wave lengths. The
spectrum of wave lengths is a continuum. Yet people perceive categories of
colours (red, green, yellow, blue) depending on previously acquired
conceptual knowledge. The same happens with emotion. Whether people
categorise an episode of core affect as anger, fear, or sadness depends on
acquired conceptual knowledge (emotion scripts).
Barrett (2006b) describes the mechanisms involved in the two factors of
her theory (Q1B). Core affect can be generated by multiple mechanisms (in
line with multi-mode models proposed by appraisal theories and network
theories), such as rule-based computation, activation of learned and innate
associations, and even purely physical mechanisms (e.g., being tired can
cause low arousal and negative valence; see also Izard, 1993). The
subsequent categorisation of core affect can also be obtained with rule-
based or associative mechanisms, but emphasis is on the associative
mechanism. The associative mechanism in Barrett’s theory resembles the
complex associative mechanism proposed by connectionist and dynamic
systems models. It is governed by principles of constraint satisfaction. That
is, various sources of information (the stimulus and previous knowledge)
constrain each other mutually until a stable solution (i.e., an emotion
category) emerges.
Category representations are not propositional7 or static, but perceptual,
embodied, and situated (Barsalou, 1999). They are perceptual in that they
have modality-specific sensory/perceptual features. They are called embo-
died because they also have motor features so that activation of them leads
to partial re-enactment or simulation of previous instances of the category
(see Damasio, 1994, for a similar proposal). Situated representations have
content that is context dependent. A person may have different scripts of
anger and the context determines which script becomes activated. For
example, anger may be manifested in fighting in the context of a playground,
in shouting in the context of traffic, and in biting one’s lip in the context of a
waiting room. Barrett further assumes that the processes in both factors
(core affect and categorisation) are often completed in an automatic way. In
addition, she does not conceive of the two factors as sequential steps but as
two sources of influence that constrain each other until they reach a stable
solution. Given that the factors of core affect and categorisation are not
separated in time and that they can rely on similar mechanisms, one may
wonder about the basis for keeping a distinction between them. One
7 It is potentially confusing to say, on the one hand, that category knowledge is conceptual,
and on the other hand, that it is not stored in propositional form. Other scholars tend to group
conceptual and propositional representations.
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possibility is that core affect is obligatory and ubiquitous, whereas
categorisation is optional.
Like network theories, Barrett (2006b) addresses the second (but not the
first) subquestion of the problems of elicitation (Q1B), intensity (Q2B), and
differentiation (Q3B). The mechanisms involved in producing core affect are
responsible for the elicitation, intensity, and raw positivenegative differ-
entiation of emotions. The mechanisms involved in the categorisation of core
affect are responsible for the further differentiation of emotional quality,
leading to experiences of anger, fear, and sadness. An important question is
which criteria are used as a basis for categorisation. The bodily correlates of
core affect are (according to Barrett) insufficiently differentiated to fulfil this
role. One option is that categorisation is based on the stimulus or its deep
structure (i.e., appraisal). Suppose a person loses a valued object and feels
bad (i.e., core affect). The person’s conceptual knowledge that in his/her
culture, the loss of a valued object is associated with sadness could be
sufficient for categorising the bad feeling as a sad feeling.
This raises the question of how to distinguish Barrett’s theory from
appraisal theories. A possible answer is that appraisal theories assume that
the loss of a valued object produces sadness regardless of one’s learning
history (influenced by culture). According to these theories, a person’s
learning history can determine which objects he/she considers as valued and
hence which events he/she appraises as losses, but it does not determine
which relations hold between appraisals and emotions. In Barrett’s view,
there are no intrinsic relations between appraisals and emotions. The loss of
something valued is not intrinsically bound up with sadness, and danger is
not intrinsically bound up with fear. These relations exist only in people’s
minds, and activation of these relations determines the narrow quality of the
emotion.8
Another difference between Barrett and appraisal theories concerns the
role of emotion categories (e.g., anger, fear, sadness). For Barrett, emotion
categories are an intrinsic part of emotional experience. They are used to
endow (low-specific) core affect with specificity. For appraisal theories,
emotion categories tend to come into the picture consequent upon
emotional experience. They can be used to label emotions or emotional
components that are already specific. The specificity of these components
stems from the appraisals that caused them.
Emotional experience is the only component in Barrett’s theory that has
specificity in the narrow sense. It is therefore tempting to consider this
8 Barrett’s (2006b) theory can explain but does not predict cultural variation. If research
could reveal that fear is universally linked to danger, this would demonstrate that this link exists
in the conceptual knowledge of all individuals of all cultures.
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theory as a feeling theory (i.e., a theory that equates emotion with emotional
experience) like the theories of James (1890) and Schachter (1964).
Like Schachter (1964) and Russell (2003), Barrett (2006b) has a two-
factor theory. The output of the first factor is less differentiated than that of
the second factor. In addition to this obvious similarity, the three theories
have other similarities and differences. First, in Schachter’s theory, the first
factor results in a state of undifferentiated arousal, whereas in the theories of
Russell and Barrett, the first factor results in core affect, which is a state in
which valence and arousal are combined. Thus, in Schachter’s theory, the
first factor only delivers intensity whereas in the theories of Russell and
Barrett, the first factor delivers intensity and raw positivenegative quality.
Second, Barrett and Russell, but not Schachter, allow cognitive processes to
intervene in the first factor. Third, Schachter conceived of the process in the
second factor as conscious; Barrett takes it to be unconscious (and otherwise
automatic) most of the time. Fourth, according to Schachter and Barrett, the
result of the second factor is emotional experience. The process in this factor
(attribution or categorisation) shapes the emotional experience. According
to Russell, however, the categorisation in the second factor is a cold cognitive
affair that comes after experience. Unlike Schachter and Barrett, Russell
does not consider the product of the second factor as the phenomenon to be
explained.
I now turn to the philosophical theories. Philosophers are less concerned
with questions of causation and mechanics, but more with questions of
ontology (What kind of a thing is an emotion? Is it a feeling, a cognition,
or a perception?) and rationality (cf. de Sousa, 1987). Nevertheless,
philosophical theories can be examined according to the criteria put forward
in this review.
PHILOSOPHICAL COGNITIVISM
Cognitivist philosophers (e.g., Lyons, 1980; Nussbaum, 1990; Solomon,
1976) reacted against James’ (1890) proposal to identify emotions with
feelings. In doing so, these philosophers relied on a narrow meaning of
feeling as the purely phenomenal part of the mental, the part that is not
about something and that cannot be captured in representational form. To
do justice to the Intentionality of emotions, cognitivist philosophers
proposed that emotions are caused by or identical to cognitions, more in
particular, judgements of the stimulus. In discussing this proposal,
philosophers elaborated on the kind of representations that judgements
are but they neglected the mechanisms that operate on or produce these
representations. Thus, they addressed only part of the algorithmic level of
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process understanding (QB). Judgements are propositional representations,
understood here as mental contents to which one ascribes truth value.
Cognitivism comes in two varieties. In a first variety, emotion is equated
with cognition (Nussbaum, 1990; Solomon, 1976). In this variety, bodily
components (somatic and motor responses) are either neglected or placed
near the end of the emotional episode (see Figure 5, top panel). Some
proponents of this variety add that emotion is a special type of judgement.
For example, Nussbaum (1990) argued that emotions are judgements that
are relevant to the person’s concerns (cf. appraisal theories). In a second
variety, emotion is caused by but not identical to cognition (e.g., Lyons,
1980). Proponents of this variety equate emotion with one or several other
components (such as feeling, motivation, and somatic and/or motor
responses; see Figure 5, bottom panel).
The cognitive component is responsible for the elicitation of emotions
(Q1; at least in the second variety) and the differentiation of emotions (Q3;
in both varieties). Emotions differ when the content of their judgements
differs. For example, anger corresponds to the judgement that one has
purposefully been harmed, fear to the judgement that one is in danger, and
sadness to the judgement that one has lost something valued forever.
Hypotheses about the relation between judgements and emotions can be
situated on the functional level of process understanding (Q1A, Q3A). They
are often similar to the hypotheses put forward by appraisal theorists about
the relation between appraisals and emotions.
Critics of cognitivism have argued that babies and animals cannot form
judgements or propositional representations, yet they seem to have
emotions. Another criticism is the ‘‘fear-of-flying’’ objection (de Sousa,
2007). One can judge that flying is the safest means of transportation (based
on statistical information) but still experience fear of flying. Thus, the
judgement that one is in danger does not seem necessary for the emotion of
Cognitive c. (Somatic c./Motor c.)
Stimulus → Process → Propositional representation = Emotion → (Bodily responses)
Cognitive c. (Feeling c./Motivational c./Somatic c./Motor c.)
Stimulus → Process operating on propositional representation → Emotional experience and/or
action tendencies and/or
bodily responses
= Emotion 
Figure 5. Order of components in cognitivist theories.
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fear. A final criticism is that the first variety of cognitivism disregards the
somatic aspects of emotion and reduces emotions to cold thoughts (see
Scarantino, in press, for a more elaborate set of criticisms).
PHILOSOPHICAL PERCEPTUAL THEORIES
Perceptual theorists of emotion (e.g., Clarke, 1986; de Sousa, 1987; Goldie,
2000) argued that emotions need not be identified with propositional
representations but can also be identified with perceptual representations
of the stimulus (see Figure 6). Here also, the distinction between proposi-
tional and perceptual is seen as a matter of truth evaluability. Propositional
representations are those that one holds to be true whereas perceptual
representations are those that one entertains without necessarily believing
them. To become scared, it is sufficient to see or construe a situation as
dangerous, without believing it for a fact. Perceptual theorists reacted
against the cognitivist view that emotion is a form of judgement. As de
Sousa (2007) put it, emotions are not so much judgements but ways of
seeing. Perceptual theorists proposed that processes involved in emotion
have more in common with those involved in perception than those involved
in judgement. For one thing, both emotion and perception arise auto-
matically. That is, they arise instantly, unintentionally, and efficiently (i.e.,
with minimal use of attentional capacity), and they are difficult to counter-
act. People lack control over their emotions in a similar way as they lack
control over their perceptions. One cannot choose to be angry or frightened
(i.e., perceive a stimulus as irritating or frightening) just as one cannot
choose to perceive an apple as an apple. For another thing, so-called
irrational emotions (i.e., emotions that run counter to one’s beliefs, e.g., fear
of flying, fear of spiders) show resemblance to perceptual illusions.
Perceptual illusions appear real and compelling, yet the person knows
(rationally*from propositional knowledge) that they are not; the person
does not necessarily believe what he/she sees. Likewise, irrational emotions
do not arise from judgements in the sense that a person believes that he/she
is in danger, yet he/she cannot escape seeing or construing the stimulus as
dangerous (cf. Goldie, 2000).
     Cognitive c.         Somatic c./Motor c. 
Stimulus → Process → Perceptual representation = Emotion → Bodily responses 
Figure 6. Order of components in perceptual theories.
652 MOORS
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 G
en
t]
 A
t:
 1
4:
57
 1
8 
De
ce
mb
er
 2
00
9
The opposition between perception and cognition evoked in this literature
stems from a narrow view of cognition. Cognitive processes are restricted to
those that operate on propositional representations (see above). Many
contemporary scholars, however, entertain a broader definition of cognition.
They argue that processes are cognitive when they are mediated by
representations, irrespective of the format of these representations (cf.
Moors, 2007). This view of cognition is broad enough to include processes
that operate on or produce perceptual representations. It is also broad
enough to include automatic processes. Thus, it turns out that philosophical
perceptual theories have a lot in common with contemporary psychological
theories that assign an important role to cognition (e.g., appraisal theories,
network theories, and Barrett’s, 2006b, theory).
Some scholars (e.g., Charland, 1997) have called James’ (1890) theory a
perceptual theory and have grouped it together with philosophical percep-
tual theories (Charland, 1997). The central process in James’ theory is the
experience of bodily responses. And it is often argued that the experience of
bodily responses is a form of (self-)perception. It is important to note,
however, that the perception in philosophical perceptual theories has a
different object or input than the perception in James’ theory. In the former,
the input of perception is the stimulus; in the latter, it is the person’s bodily
responses to the stimulus. Put differently, even if one would argue that the
feeling in James’s theory is not purely phenomenal and has an Intentional
aspect, it must still be stressed that the feeling in his theory is about bodily
responses and not about the meaning of the stimulus.
An obvious similarity between Barrett’s (2006b) theory and philosophical
perceptual theories is that both emphasise the role of perceptual representa-
tions. The meaning of the term perceptual representation, however, is
somewhat different in both theories. Barrett emphasises the sensory (image-
like) properties of perceptual representations. Philosophical perceptual
theories stress that perceptual representations have content that one
entertains without necessarily believing it. Such content can still be coded
in a verbal-like format.
CONCLUSION
I have presented an overview of theories concerned with emotion causation
selected from both the psychological and philosophical literature. I have
used psychological terminology to draw similarities and indicate differences
among these theories. Five sources of variation among theories were
identified.
A first source of variation is the definition of emotion endorsed. Most
emotion theories have a list of components that they consider part of an
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emotional episode. Individual theories differ with regard to the number and
nature of the components that they include in the emotional episode as well
as the components that they identify with the emotion. Part of the
disagreement about the explanation of emotion stems from disagreement
about what to count as emotion. Theories further disagree about the
building blocks of emotional life (basic emotions versus sub-emotional
variables), about the status they confer to the class of specific emotions
(natural kind versus artefact) and about the boundaries of this class.
A second source of variation has to do with the components that theories
invoke to solve the problems of elicitation (Q1), intensity (Q2), and
differentiation (Q3). These are three problems that I think theories of
emotion causation should address. The theories of James (1890) and
Schachter (1964) put forward the somatic component to account for the
intensity of emotion. Differentiation in James’ (1890) theory is accounted for
by the somatic component; in Schachter’s (1964) theory it is accomplished
by a cognitive component. James and Schachter both fail to address the
elicitation problem. Appraisal theories and network theories take cognition
to account for elicitation, intensity, and differentiation of emotions. In both
theories, however, there is room for the activation of direct stimulus
response connections that count as non-cognitive according to most views
of cognition. In Barrett’s theory, elicitation, intensity, and raw positive
negative differentiation of emotions can be accounted for by cognitive as
well as purely physical processes. The further differentiation into specific
emotional experiences is a matter of cognition (i.e., categorisation process).
The two philosophical theories discussed take the cognitive component to be
responsible for the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, at least if
cognition is understood in a broad representation-mediated sense.
The problems of elicitation, intensity, and differentiation can be
considered at the functional level, the algorithmic level, and the implemen-
tational level. A third source of variation among theories is the levels of
process description that they address. At the functional level, it can be asked
which stimuli elicit emotions versus no emotions (Q1A), which stimuli elicit
weak emotions versus strong ones (Q2A), and which stimuli elicit which
emotions (positive versus negative ones, or specific ones; Q3A). These
questions have received most attention from appraisal theories, and to some
extent, from philosophical cognitivist theories. Another question that can be
situated on the functional level concerns the conditions (optimal versus
suboptimal) under which emotion-eliciting processes occur. Many of the
theories discussed have taken position with regard to this question (appraisal
theories; network theories; Barrett, 2006b; perceptual theories) and some
have been ascribed a position (Schachter, 1964; cognitivist theories). At the
algorithmic level, it can be asked which mechanisms (rule-based versus
associative) and which formats of representation (propositional versus
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perceptual) are involved in the elicitation (Q1B), intensity (Q2B), and
differentiation (Q3B) of emotions. Appraisal theories, network theories, and
Barrett (2006b) have discussed mechanisms and formats of representation.
The two philosophical theories have only discussed formats of representa-
tion. At the implementational level, it can be asked which neurological
structures or circuits are involved in the elicitation (Q1C), intensity (Q2C),
and differentiation (Q3C) of emotions. The unique contribution of affect
program theory to the issue of emotion causation can be situated on this
level. This is not to say that other theories have neglected this level (see
James, 1890; Barrett, 2006b, Scherer & Peper, 2001).
A fourth source of variation has to do with the kind of process that
emotion theories hold responsible for emotion elicitation. Some theories
have different assumptions about the conditions (optimal versus suboptimal)
under which this process can operate. In philosophical cognitivist theories
and Schachter’s theory, the cognitive process that causes emotions is most
likely conceived of as a conscious process. In most other theories, the
emotion-antecedent process is assumed to be unconscious (and otherwise
automatic) most of the time. Theories sometimes propose a different format
for the representations involved in emotion causation. Cognitivist theories
choose representations with a propositional format; perceptual theories
appraisal theories, network theories, and Barrett (2006b) leave room for
representations with a perceptual format. Theories may also differ with
regard to the mechanisms that they put forward. Some of the theories
discussed do not provide details about mechanisms (James, 1890; Schachter,
1964; philosophical theories), but it is unlikely that they all envisage the same
mechanism. The theories that do elaborate on mechanisms seem to be
largely in agreement with each other. Appraisal theories, network theories,
and Barrett all agree that stimulus evaluation can be accomplished by
multiple mechanisms: rule-based, associative, sensory-motor, and (for some)
purely physical mechanisms. In most theories, it seems that the associative
mechanism plays the leading part. The associative mechanism that figures in
older versions of network theory and appraisal theory have localist
representations and seem to be activated in a sequential manner. The
associative mechanism that figures in Barrett’s theory and in modern
versions of network theory (e.g., Lewis, 2005) and appraisal theory (e.g.,
Scherer, 2000) is modelled after the complex associative mechanism
proposed in connectionist or dynamic systems models.
A fifth and final source of disagreement is the order in which emotion
theories place the components of the emotional episode. James (1890) placed
the somatic component prior to the feeling component. Schachter (1964)
kept James’ order of events except that he interposed a cognitive component
between the somatic and the feeling components. In appraisal theories, the
cognitive component occurs prior to the motivational component. This
EMOTION CAUSATION 655
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 G
en
t]
 A
t:
 1
4:
57
 1
8 
De
ce
mb
er
 2
00
9
motivational component is followed by the components of somatic
responses and behaviour. Each of these components is logically prior to
the feeling component. Network theories do not prioritise one specific order
of components. Cognition may precede somatic responses, but somatic
responses may also precede cognition. Unlike Schachter (1964) and Russell
(2003), Barrett (2006b) does not suppose that the two factors in her theory
(core affect and categorisation) happen sequentially. They are triggered
simultaneously and constrain each other mutually. Given the embodied
nature of the representations in her theory, there is not a strict separation
between somatic and cognitive components. The sharp distinction between
mind and body is eluded.
In addition to disagreement, the above summary also reveals that there
is a great deal of agreement among theories. For one thing, all the theories
discussed can be fitted into the componential mould. Several theories even
agree on the majority of the components that they include. For another,
several theories assume that emotion-antecedent processing is cognitive (at
least in a broad representation-mediated sense), that it can be automatic,
and that multiple mechanisms and representations can be involved. Finally,
the overview shows that there is an evolution from assumptions of non-
automatic, propositional, and step-wise processing toward assumptions of
more automatic, perceptual, and parallel processing. This evolution
corresponds to evolutions in other domains of psychology. In conclusion,
the proposed framework brings to the surface differences as well as
similarities among theories of emotion causation. This may be helpful in
reducing confusion and in pointing out new directions for future research.
By relativising superficial differences among theories, there is more energy
left to concentrate on the fundamental ones and to move the field forward.
It is my hope that the present framework will also prove useful for the
comparison of emotion theories that were not discussed in the present
paper and for emotion theories that will be proposed in the future.
Manuscript received 28 January 2008
Revised manuscript received 14 November 2008
Manuscript accepted 20 November 2008
First published online 31 March 2009
REFERENCES
Arnold, M. B. (1960). Emotion and personality. New York: Columbia University Press.
Baeyens, F., Eelen, P., & Van den Bergh, O. (1990). Contingency awareness in evaluative
conditioning: A case for unaware affective-evaluative learning. Cognition and Emotion, 4,
318.
656 MOORS
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 G
en
t]
 A
t:
 1
4:
57
 1
8 
De
ce
mb
er
 2
00
9
Bargh, J. A. (1989). Conditional automaticity: Varieties of automatic influence in social
perception and cognition. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp.
351). New York: Guilford Press.
Bargh, J. A., & Barndollar, K. (1996). Automaticity in action: The unconscious as repository of
chronic goals and motives. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The psychology of
action: Linking cognition and motivation to behavior (pp. 457481). New York: Guilford
Press.
Barrett, L. F. (2005). Feeling is perceiving: Core affect and conceptualization in the experience
of emotion. In L. F. Barrett, P. Niedenthal, & P. Winkielman (Eds.), Emotion and
consciousness (pp. 255284). New York: Guilford Press.
Barrett, L. F. (2006a). Are emotions natural kinds? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1,
2858.
Barrett, L. F. (2006b). Solving the emotion paradox: Categorization and the experience of
emotion. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 2046.
Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577660.
Berkowitz, L. (1990). On the formation and regulation of anger and aggression: A cognitive-
neoassociationistic analysis. American Psychologist, 45, 494503.
Berkowitz, L., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2004). Toward an understanding of the determinants of
anger. Emotion, 4, 107130.
Bermude´z, J. L. (1995). Nonconceptual content: From perceptual experience to subpersonal
computational states. Mind and Language, 10, 333369.
Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 18, 227287.
Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36, 129148.
Cacioppo, J. T., Berntson, G. G., Larsen, J. T., Poehlmann, K. M., & Ito, T. A. (2000). The
psychophysiology of emotion. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of
emotions (2nd ed, pp. 173191). New York: Guilford Press.
Cannon, W. B. (1927). The JamesLange theory of emotions: Critical examinations and an
alternative theory. American Journal of Psychology, 39, 106124.
Charland, L. C. (1997). Reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion: A
representational proposal. Philosophy of Science, 64, 555579.
Christie, I. C., & Friedman, B. H. (2004). Autonomic specificity of discrete emotions and
dimensions of affective space: A multivariate approach. International Journal of Psychophy-
siology, 51, 143153.
Chwalisz, K., Diener, E., & Gallagher, D. (1988). Autonomic arousal feedback and emotional
experience: Evidence from the spinal cord injured. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 54, 820828.
Clarke, S. G. (1986). Emotions: Rationality without cognitivism. Dialogue, 25, 663674.
Clore, G. L., & Centerbar, D. (2004). Analyzing anger: How to make people mad. Emotion, 4,
139144.
Clore, G. L., & Ortony, A. (2000). Cognition in emotion: Always, sometimes, or never? In R. D.
Lane & L. Nadel (Eds.), Cognitive neuroscience of emotion (pp. 2461). New York: Oxford
University Press.
Cornelius, R. R. (1996). The science of emotion: Research and tradition in the psychology of
emotion. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York:
Putnam.
Damasio, A. (1999). The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of
consciousness. New York: Harcourt.
Davidson, R. J. (1992). Prolegomenon to the structure of emotion: Gleanings from
neuropsychology. Cognition and Emotion, 6, 245268.
EMOTION CAUSATION 657
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 G
en
t]
 A
t:
 1
4:
57
 1
8 
De
ce
mb
er
 2
00
9
Darwin, C. (1965). The expression of the emotions in man and animals (p. 1872). Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. (Original work published).
de Sousa, R. (1987). The rationality of emotion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
de Sousa, R. (2007). Emotion. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy
(Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/entries/emotion/)
Descartes, R. (1998). The passions of the soul. In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, & D. Murdoch
(Eds.), Selected philosophical writings of Rene´ Descartes. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press. (Original work published 1644).
Ekman, P. (1972). Universals and cultural differences in facial expressions of emotion. In J. Cole
(Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation 1971 (Vol. 19, pp. 207283). Lincoln, NE:
University of Nebraska Press.
Ekman, P., Levenson, R. W., & Friesen, W. V. (1983). Autonomic nervous system activity
distinguishes among emotions. Science, 221(4616), 12081210.
Ekman, P. (1984). Expression and the nature of emotion. In K. R. Scherer & P. Ekman (Eds.),
Approaches to emotion (pp. 319343). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Ekman, P. (1992). An argument for basic emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 6, 169200.
Ekman, P. (2007). The directed facial action task. In J. A. Coan & J. J. B. Allen (Eds.), Handbook
of emotion elicitation and assessment (pp. 4753). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., & Ellsworth, P. (1972). Emotion in the human face: Guidelines for
research and an integration of findings. New York: Pergamon Press.
Fodor, J. A. (1980). Representations: Essays on the foundations of cognitive science. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Frijda, N. H. (1986). The emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Frijda, N. H. (1993). The place of appraisal in emotion. Cognition and Emotion, 7, 357387.
Frijda, N. H. (2007). What emotions might be? Comments on the comments. Social Science
Information, 46, 433443.
Frijda, N. H., & Zeelenberg, M. (2001). What is the dependent? In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T.
Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion (pp. 141155). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Goldie, P. (2000). The emotions: A philosophical exploration. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Green, C. D. (1996). Where did the word ‘‘cognitive’’ come from anyway? Canadian Psychology,
37, 3139.
Izard, C. E. (1977). Human emotions. New York: Plenum Press.
Izard, C. E. (1993). Four systems of emotion activation: Cognitive and noncognitive processes.
Psychological Review, 100, 6890.
James, W. (1884). What is an emotion? Mind, 9, 188205.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York: Dover.
Johnstone, T., van Reekum, C. M., & Scherer, K. R. (2001). Vocal correlates of appraisal
processes. In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion
(pp. 271284). New York: Oxford University Press.
Kaiser, S., & Wehrle, T. (2001). Facial expressions as indicators of appraisal processes. In K.
Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Kunst-Wilson, W. R., & Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Affective discrimination of stimuli that cannot be
recognized. Science, 207, 557558.
Lang, P. J. (1985). The cognitive psychophysiology of fear and anxiety. In A. H. Tuma & J. D.
Maser (Eds.), Anxiety and the anxiety disorders (pp. 131170). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
658 MOORS
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 G
en
t]
 A
t:
 1
4:
57
 1
8 
De
ce
mb
er
 2
00
9
Lang, P. J. (1994). The motivational organization of emotion: Affectreflex connections. In S. H.
M. Van Goozen, N. E. Van de Poll, & J. A. Sergeant (Eds.), Emotions: Essays on emotion
theory (pp. 6192). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Lazarus, R. S. (1966). Psychological stress and the coping process. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Lazarus, R. S. (1982). Thoughts on the relations between emotion and cognition. American
Psychologist, 37, 10191024.
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Levenson, R. W. (1992). Autonomic nervous system differences among emotions. Psychological
Science, 3, 2327.
Levenson, R. W., Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1990). Voluntary facial action generates emotion-
specific autonomic nervous system activity. Psychophysiology, 27, 363384.
Leventhal, H. (1980). Toward a comprehensive theory of emotion. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 13, pp. 139197). New York: Academic
Press.
Leventhal, H. (1984). A perceptual-motor theory of emotion. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in
experimental social psychology (Vol. 17, pp. 117182). New York: Academic Press.
Leventhal, H., & Scherer, K. R. (1987). The relationship of emotion to cognition: A functional
approach to a semantic controversy. Cognition and Emotion, 1, 328.
Lewis, M. D. (2005). Bridging emotion theory and neurobiology through dynamic system
modeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 169194.
Lyons, W. (1980). Emotion. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Marr, D. (Ed.). (1982). Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation and
processing of visual information. New York: Freeman.
Martin, I., & Levey, A. B. (1978). Evaluative conditioning. Advances in Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 1, 57102.
Moors, A. (2007). Can cognitive methods be used to study the unique aspect of emotion: An
appraisal theorist’s answer. Cognition and Emotion, 21, 12381269.
Moors, A. (2008). Automatic constructive appraisal as a candidate cause of emotion. Manuscript
submitted for publication.
Moors, A., & De Houwer, J. (2006a). Automaticity: A theoretical and conceptual analysis.
Psychological Bulletin, 132, 297326.
Moors, A., & De Houwer, J. (2006b). Problems with dividing the realm of cognitive processes.
Psychological Inquiry, 17, 199204.
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review, 83, 435450.
Niedenthal, P. M., Krauth-Gruber, S., & Ric, F. (2006). Psychology of emotion: Interpersonal,
experiential, and cognitive approaches. New York: Psychology Press.
Nisbet, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental
processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231259.
Nussbaum, M. (1990). Love’s knowledge. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Oatley, K., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1987). Towards a cognitive theory of emotions. Cognition
and Emotion, 1, 2950.
.O¨hman, A., & Mineka, S. (2001). Fears, phobias, and preparedness: Toward an evolved module
of fear and fear learning. Psychological Review, 108, 483826.
Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., & Collins, A. (1988). The cognitive structure of emotions. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Ortony, A., & Turner, T. J. (1990). What’s basic about basic emotions? Psychological Review, 97,
315331.
Panksepp, J. (1982). Toward a general psychobiological theory of emotions. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 5, 407467.
Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective neuroscience: The foundations of human and animal emotions. New
York: Oxford University Press.
EMOTION CAUSATION 659
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 G
en
t]
 A
t:
 1
4:
57
 1
8 
De
ce
mb
er
 2
00
9
Panksepp, J. (2000). Emotions as natural kinds within the mammalian brain. In M. Lewis &
J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (2nd ed., pp. 137156). New York:
Guilford Press.
Parkinson, B., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1992). Appraisal as a cause of emotion. In M. S. Clark
(Ed.), Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 13, pp. 122149). Newbury Park, CA:
Sage.
Parrott, G. W. (2007). Components and the definition of emotion. Social Science Information,
46, 419423.
Pecchinenda, A. (2001). The psychophysiology of appraisals. In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, &
T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, Methods, Research (pp. 301
318). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Pleyers, G., Corneille, O., Luminet, O., & Yzerbyt, V. (2007). Aware and (dis)liking: Item-based
analyses reveal that valence acquisition via evaluative conditioning emerges only when there
is contingency awareness. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 33, 130144.
Power, M., & Dalgleish, T. (2007). Cognition and emotion: From order to disorder (2nd ed.).
Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Prinz, J. J. (2004). Gut reactions: A perceptual theory of emotion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Reisenzein, R. (1983). The Schachter theory of emotion: Two decades later. Psychological
Bulletin, 94, 239264.
Reisenzein, R. (2001). Appraisal processes conceptualized from a schema-theoretic perspective:
Contributions to a process analysis of emotions. In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone
(Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion (pp. 187201). New York: Oxford University Press.
Rime´, B., Philippot, P., & Cisamolo, D. (1990). Social schemata of peripheral changes in
emotion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 3849.
Robinson, M. D., & Clore, G. L. (2002). Belief and feeling: Evidence for an accessibility model
of emotional self-report. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 934960.
Roseman, I. J. (1991). Appraisal determinants of discrete emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 5,
161200.
Roseman, I. J., Antoniou, A. A., & Jose´, P. E. (1996). Appraisal determinants of emotions:
Constructing a more accurate and comprehensive theory. Cognition and Emotion, 10(3),
241277.
Roseman, I. J., & Smith, C. A. (2001). Appraisal theory: Overview, assumptions, varieties,
controversies. In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in
emotion (pp. 334). New York: Oxford University Press.
Russell, J. A. (1994). Is there universal recognition of emotion from facial expression? A review
of the cross-cultural studies. Psychological Bulletin, 115, 102141.
Russell, J. A. (2003). Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion. Psychological
Review, 110, 145172.
Russell, J. A., & Barrett, L. F. (1999). Core affect, prototypical emotional episodes; and other
things called emotion: Dissecting the elephant. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
76, 805819.
Scarantino, A. (in press) Insights and blindspots of the cognitivist theory of emotions. British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Schachter, S. (1964). The interaction of cognitive and physiological determinants of emotional
state. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 4980).
New York: Academic Press.
Schachter, S., & Singer, J. (1962). Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional
state. Psychological Review, 69, 379399.
660 MOORS
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 G
en
t]
 A
t:
 1
4:
57
 1
8 
De
ce
mb
er
 2
00
9
Scherer, K. R. (1984). On the nature and function of emotions: A component process approach.
In K. R. Scherer & P. Ekman (Eds.), Approaches to emotion (pp. 293317). Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Scherer, K. R. (1988). Criteria for emotion-antecedent appraisal: A review. In V. Hamilton,
G. H. Bower, & N. H. Frijda (Eds.), Cognitive perspectives on emotion and motivation (pp. 89
126). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.
Scherer, K. R. (1993a). Neuroscience projections to current debates in emotion psychology.
Cognition and Emotion, 7, 141.
Scherer, K. R. (1993b). Studying the emotion-antecedent appraisal process: An expert system
approach. Cognition and Emotion, 7, 325355.
Scherer, K. R. (1994). Toward a concept of ‘‘modal emotions’’. In P. Ekman & R. J. Davidson
(Eds.), The nature of emotion: Fundamental questions (pp. 2531). Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Scherer, K. R. (1997). Profiles of emotion-antecedent appraisals: Testing theoretical predictions
across cultures. Cognition and Emotion, 11, 113150.
Scherer, K. R. (1999). Appraisal theory. In T. Dalgleish & M. Power (Eds.), Handbook of
cognition and emotion (pp. 637661). Chichester, UK: Wiley.
Scherer, K. R. (2000). Emotions as episodes of subsystem synchronization driven by nonlinear
appraisal processes. In M. D. Lewis & I. Granic (Eds.), Emotion, development, and self-
organization: Dynamic systems approaches to emotional development (pp. 7099). Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Scherer, K. R. (2001). Appraisal considered as a process of multilevel sequential checking. In
K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion (pp. 92120).
New York: Oxford University Press.
Scherer, K. R. (2004). Feelings integrate the central representation of appraisal-driven response
organization in emotion. In A. S. R. Manstead, N. H. Frijda, & A. H. Fischer (Eds.),
Feelings and emotions: The Amsterdam symposium (pp. 136157). Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Scherer, K. R. (2005). What are emotions? And how can they be measured? Social Science
Information, 44, 695729.
Scherer, K. R., & Peper, M. (2001). Psychological theories of emotion and neuropsychological
research. In F. Boller & J. Grafman (Eds.), Handbook of neuropsychology (Vol. 5, pp. 1748).
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Shanks, D. R., & Dickinson, A. (1990). Contingency awareness in evaluative conditioning: A
comment on Baeyens, Eelen, and Van den Bergh. Cognition and Emotion, 4, 1930.
Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 813838.
Smith, C. A., & Kirby, L. D. (2000). Consequences require antecedents: Towards a process
model of emotion elicitation. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in
social cognition (pp. 83106). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, C. A., & Kirby, L. D. (2001). Toward delivering on the promise of appraisal theory. In
K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion (pp. 121
138). New York: Oxford University Press.
Smith, C. A., & Lazarus, R. S. (1993). Appraisal components, core relational themes, and the
emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 7, 233269.
Smith, E. R., & Neumann, R. (2005). Emotion processes considered from the perspective of
dual process models. In P. Niedenthal, L. Feldman-Barrett, & P. Winkielman (Eds.), The
unconscious in emotion (pp. 287311). New York: Guilford Press.
Solomon, R. C. (1976). The passions: Emotions and the meaning of life. New York: Doubleday.
EMOTION CAUSATION 661
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 G
en
t]
 A
t:
 1
4:
57
 1
8 
De
ce
mb
er
 2
00
9
Teasdale, J. D. (1999). Multi-level theories of cognitionemotion relations. In T. Dalgleish &
M. Power (Eds.), Handbook of cognition and emotion (pp. 665682). Chichester, UK: Wiley.
Tomkins, S. S. (1962). Affect, imagery, consciousness: Vol. 1: The positive affects. New York:
Springer.
van Reekum, C. M., & Scherer, K. R. (1997). Levels of processing in emotion-antecedent
appraisal. In G. Matthews (Ed.), Cognitive science perspectives on personality and emotion
(pp. 259300). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. American
Psychologist, 3, 151175.
662 MOORS
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 G
en
t]
 A
t:
 1
4:
57
 1
8 
De
ce
mb
er
 2
00
9
